The Peace That Nobody Signed Together: How Westphalia Invented Your Passport
Two cities, 109 delegations, zero plenary sessions, and a set of treaties that historians say never actually said what everyone thinks they said.

The most consequential peace settlement in European history was negotiated by men who never once sat in the same room. The Peace of Westphalia is the collective name for two peace treaties signed in October 1648 in the Westphalian cities of Osnabrück and Münster, and the 109 delegations that arrived to represent the belligerent states were never all present at the same time [1]. The peace negotiations had no exact beginning or end, because the 109 delegations never met in a plenary session [1].[1]
Two Cities, Two Religions, One Very Long Courier Route

The split was not bureaucratic convenience. Talks took place in two cities because each side wanted to meet on territory under its own control [1]. Münster was a strictly mono-denominational Catholic community where only Roman Catholic worship was permitted, while Calvinism and Lutheranism were prohibited [1]. Osnabrück was a bi-denominational Lutheran and Catholic city, with two Lutheran churches and two Catholic churches [1]. Sweden preferred to negotiate with the Holy Roman Empire in Osnabrück, which was controlled by Protestant forces [1].[1]
In Münster, negotiations took place between the Holy Roman Empire and France, as well as between the Dutch Republic and Spain [1]. In Osnabrück, the envoys of the Emperor, the Estates of the Empire, and of Sweden met, while the discussions between the diplomatic agents of the Emperor, the Estates, France, and the other foreign powers took place in Münster, according to Oxford Public International Law [11]. The Westphalian towns had been determined as places of the peace negotiations in the course of preliminary talks in Hamburg at the end of 1641, but it was only three years later that the actual negotiations began [11]. The ambassadors were to arrive at Münster and Osnabrück on July 11, 1643 [12].[1][11][12]
The mechanics were grueling. The Venetian ambassador Aloysius Contarini mediated for about five years [12]. Compromises over questions of protocol, many of which were only achieved after prolonged negotiations, served as a precedent for later international conferences and congresses [11]. The settlement included the Franco-Imperial Treaty of Münster and the Swedish-Imperial Treaty of Osnabrück, both signed on 24 October 1648, alongside the Spanish-Dutch Treaty of Münster signed on 30 January 1648 [2]. In that third treaty, Spain recognized the independence of the Netherlands [11]. The Franco-Spanish War continued after 1648 and was settled only by the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 [2].[2][11][12]
"The peace negotiations had no exact beginning or end, because the 109 delegations never met in a plenary session."
What the Treaties Actually Said — and What They Didn't
Here is where the story gets awkward. The settlement ended the central conflicts of the Thirty Years' War within the Holy Roman Empire and reorganized important questions of religion, territorial authority, imperial government, restitution, diplomacy, and peace, according to diplomacyandlaw.com [2]. It strengthened the legal position of the Imperial Estates, revised the Empire's religious settlement, recognized important territorial arrangements, placed limits on imperial decision-making, and reinforced treaty-based methods of European peacemaking [2]. The Osnabrück treaty was expressly incorporated into the constitutional settlement of the Empire rather than operating simply as a military truce [2]. The Peace of Westphalia reformed the Imperial Constitution to create non-violent processes for adjudicating religious disputes and reduced the authority over religious matters accorded to German princes in the 1555 Peace of Augsburg [13]. It generally revitalized the Empire as a supranational political entity [13].[2][13]
But the treaties did not, as is often claimed, invent the sovereign state. Historical scholarship has shown that territorial sovereignty was not expressly formulated as a general doctrine in the agreements, the Holy Roman Empire survived, and its constituent political entities remained embedded in a complex constitutional order [2]. Recent scholarship has argued that the titular Westphalian treaties in 1648 actually had little to do with the principles with which they are often associated: sovereignty, non-intervention, and the legal equality of states [9]. Andreas Osiander writes that the treaties confirm neither France's nor Sweden's sovereignty nor anybody else's, and least of all do they contain anything about sovereignty as a principle [9]. Christoph Kampann and Johannes Paulmann argue that the 1648 treaties limited the sovereignty of numerous states within the Holy Roman Empire and did not present a coherent new state-system, although they were part of an ongoing change [9]. The Peace of Westphalia was almost exclusively concerned with the Holy Roman Empire [4].[2][4][9]
The standard story of the Thirty Years' War as a struggle between universalist and particularist actors is dubious, according to a 2001 article by Andreas Osiander in International Organization [4][14]. The original Bohemian crisis did not break out because the Habsburgs were powerful, but because in important respects they were weak [4]. None of the actors fighting the Habsburgs went to war for defensive purposes, and neither their survival nor even their independence was at stake in this war [4]. The Thirty Years' War, which devastated Europe between 1618 and 1648, was a complex conflict: it was a religious war; it involved the main powers of the time, dynasty rivalries, and more [14].[4][14]
How a Practical Compromise Became a Global Operating System
The Westphalian order refers to the conception of global politics as a system of independent sovereign states, all of which are equal to each other under law [5]. The most popular story traces its birth to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 [5]. Scholars over the last two decades have painstakingly shown the complete mismatch between the story of Westphalia and the historical evidence [5]. Yet the concept of sovereignty became normalized in the international realm officially with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia [7]. The settlement allowed various princely German states to have full domestic autonomy, including freedom for the government to choose its religious denomination within their own borders, and to treat each other as legal equals in their external affairs [7].[5][7]
Versions of this type of diplomacy eventually went global through the colonial expansion of certain European states and adaptations by successful non-European states, according to peacediplomacy.org [7]. As Europe colonized much of the rest of the world from the fifteenth through the nineteenth centuries, the state system spread around the globe, according to Beyond Intractability [8]. Newly independent post-colonial nations sought to assert their own sovereignty and independence as the era of European dominance came to a close [7]. The principle is enshrined in the United Nations Charter, which states that nothing shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state [9]. According to the principle, every state, no matter how large or small, has an equal right to sovereignty [9].[7][8][9]
The European colonization of Asia and Africa in the 19th century and two global wars in the 20th century dramatically undermined the principles established in Westphalia, according to Lumen Learning [10]. Driven by the horrors of the Nazi genocide and the lessons of the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal, the society of states forged a series of agreements under the auspices of the United Nations that committed states to protect the human rights of their own citizens [8]. Today, sovereignty is essentially based on borders, not any capacity on the part of governments [8]. Forms of state, meanings of sovereignty, and conceptions of territoriality are neither fixed nor constant across time and place [6]. The concepts of state, sovereignty, and territory are each socially constructed [6]. State and sovereignty are mutually constitutive concepts, and as F.H. Hinsley observed, the origin and history of the concept of sovereignty are closely linked with the nature, the origin and the history of the state [6].[6][8][10]
The Tool That Won't Stay in the Toolbox
The idealized 'Westphalian state' has distinct boundaries, and until recently, its ideal of sovereignty emphasized the right of nonintervention and the inviolability of borders [6]. That ideal is now under pressure from every direction. The modern state and sovereignty have been co-determining since their common origins as concepts and associated practices in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries [6]. Sovereignty is in fact a relatively recent innovation connected to the emergence of the nation-state as the primary unit of political organization [8]. The development of a system of sovereign states culminated in Europe at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 [8]. But the Peace of Westphalia was a series of peace treaties signed between May and October 1648 in the Westphalian cities of Osnabrück and Münster [10]. It established the precedent of peace reached by diplomatic congress and a new system of political order in Europe based upon the concept of co-existing sovereign states [10]. The 350th anniversary of the Peace of Westphalia in 1998 was largely ignored by the discipline of international relations [14]. There has recently been much debate about whether the 'Westphalian system' is about to end [14].[6][8][10][14]
The practical legacy is not a doctrine but a habit: a set of protocols for talking across lines that were themselves drawn by the talking. The Peace of Westphalia designated France and Sweden as guarantors of its provisions, including the constitutional provisions for the Empire contained therein [13]. That is a very specific, very human arrangement — two exhausted powers agreeing to police a settlement they had not fully designed. The treaties of Münster and Osnabrück in 1648 did not hand down a law of nature. They handed down a working compromise, negotiated by couriers over years, between men who never met. Every time a border is drawn, a treaty is cited, or a nation claims sovereignty, it echoes that compromise.[13]
Sources
- Peace of Westphalia - Wikipedia — en.wikipedia.org
- Treaty of Westphalia (1648): Meaning, Sovereignty, and International Law — diplomacyandlaw.com
- Münster and Osnabrück – Sites of the Peace of Westphalia, Germany - Culture and Creativity — culture.ec.europa.eu
- Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian ... — library.fes.de
- Beyond the Nation-State - Boston Review — bostonreview.net
- Sage Reference - Handbook of International Relations - State, Sovereignty, and Territory — sk.sagepub.com
- Sovereignty: Keystone of the International System - The Institute for Peace and Diplomacy - l’Institut pour la paix et la diplomatie — peacediplomacy.org
- Sovereignty | Beyond Intractability — beyondintractability.org
- Wikipedia: Westphalian system — en.wikipedia.org
- The Peace of Westphalia and Sovereignty | Western Civilization — courses.lumenlearning.com
- Oxford Public International Law: Westphalia, Peace of (1648) — opil.ouplaw.com
- Avalon Project - Treaty of Westphalia — avalon.law.yale.edu
- The Myth of Westphalia | The Duck of Minerva — duckofminerva.com
- [PDF] Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth | Semantic Scholar — semanticscholar.org
Reported with AI assistance using internet sources.